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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THB STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
RONALD DALE EASTHOPE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 18310 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant, Ronald Dale Easthope, appeals from a 
conviction of aggravated sexual assault in the Third Judicial 
District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was charged with one count of aggravated 
sexual assault, a first-degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann.,§ 76-5-405 (1978). On February 8, 1982, appellant 
was found guilty of the crime as charged by a jury. On 
February 23, 1982, Third District Judge Dean E. Conder 
sentenced appellant to the statutory term of five years to 
life in the Utah State Prison. Judge Conder further 
recommended that appellant serve thirty years on said sentence 
prior to release or parole (R. 124). 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent requests that the vernict and judgment 
rerrlered in the lower court be affirmed. 
STATP.MBNT OF FACTS 
On September 22, 19Al, appellant was charged by 
information with commission of the crime of aqqravated sexual 
assault, a first-negree felony (R. 16). The assault was 
committed in the victim's apartment at 1010 Downington Avenue, 
in the Sugarhouse area of Salt Lake City. Appellant had been 
convicten of two counts of rape and robbery in 1971 (T. 400) 
and, aespite the absence of any evidence in the record on 
appeal, it is conceded by respondent that appellant was known 
as the "Sugarhouse Rapist" by some members of the legal and 
law enforcement communities. 
On October 6, 1981, following appellant's arrest, 
Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney Ernie Jones filed a Motion 
and Order for Production of Hair and Rody Fluid Samples (R. 
7-8). The state's Motion was heard hy Fifth Circuit Judge 
Arthur G. Christean on October 8, 1981 (R. 6) and granted on 
October 14, 1981 (R. 8). Hair and blood samples were obtained 
from appellant. 
The preliminary hearinq was held on October 22, 1981 
before Judge Christean; appellant was bound over for trial in 
the district court at the conclusion of the hearing (R. 5). 
The hearing took place with very little publicity (T. 3). 
-2-
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On December 2, 1981, counsel for appellant filed 
a Motion to Suppress the hair and blooa samples based upon his 
contention that Judge Christean was without jurisdiction to 
issue the Order compelling the samples (R. 22). Appellant 
filed an Amerrlen Motion to Suppress on December 4, 1981, 
adding state and federal constitutional objections to the 
samples (R. 27)1 the state filed a memorandum in opposition 
thereto (R. 35-40). Following argument on December 4, 1981 
(R. 26), Third District Judge Peter F. Leary denied 
appellant's Motion to Suppress (R. 41). 
Appellant's four-day jury trial began on February 3, 
1982, before the Honorable Dean E. Conder, Third District 
Judge. Before the trial started, a meeting in chambers was 
held to discuss appellant's Motion to Sequester the Jury (R. 
42: T. 2-5). No members of the press were present in the 
courtroom at that time and Judge Conder denied the Motion with 
leave to counsel for appellant to renew the Motion (T. 3). 
Jury voir dire was begun with a panel of twenty 
prospective jurors (R. 57). Three members of the panel were 
excused by the court, but it was shown that none of the panel 
of twenty either knew the appellant (T. 11) or had heard of 
the incident (T. 12). During voir dire, the panel was 
admonished not to •read, hear, listen to or see anything in 
the news media regarding this case: whether or not it's by 
television, newspaper or whatever means" (T. 25-26). 
-3-
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At the conclusion of the victim's (the state's first 
witness) testimony during the first afternoon of trial, ~udge 
Conder recessea the proceedings and convened a Meeting in 
chambers between counsel and Dick Allgire, ~UTV, Channel 2. 
Judge Conder then entered an order prohibiting the media from 
referring to appellant as the "Sugarhouse :Rapist" or to any of 
appellant's "activities prior to the trial that would in any 
way show his involvement with the law" (~. 91-92). Counsel 
for KUTV unsuccessfully sought injunctive relief from this 
Court from Judge Conder's Order (T. 121). 
On the second morning of trial, appellant's counsel 
renewe~ the µotion to Sequester and asked that the individual 
jurors be polled. Counsel based the renewal of the Motion 
upon two news broadcasts from the preceding evening. Judge 
Conder denied both the Motion and the request, stating: 
(T. 121). 
I heard the news report. I don't think 
that that was prejudicial ••• I think 
that if we call them in and ask them about 
it we only fan the flames even worse. 
nuring the course of the trial, Judge Conder 
repeatedly admonished the jurors to refrain from anv contact 
with the news media('!'. 35, 117, ,.66, 321, 304). No 
violations of the judge's Orner or any instances of 
inadv~rtent exposure of jurors to publicity were alleged. 
-4-
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• 
On the final day of trial, appellant took the stand 
and acknowledged the prior rape and robbery and convictions 
an3 his extensive incarceration (T. 400-402, 418-419). The 
jury deliberated for less then two hours (T. 490, 491) and 
returned a verdict of guilty as charged (T. 491). 
ARGUMRNT 
POI~lT I 
THE CIRCUIT CC"HlRT JTJT)r,F. PP.()PP.PLY RF.QUIRP.D 
APPELT .. ANT 'r'O PERMIT THF TARIN~ OF BLOOD 
AND HAIR. SAMPLF.S. 
Utah Code Ann.,~ 77-35-16(h) (Supp. 19Al)* states, 
in pertinent part: 
(h) Subject to constitutional limitations, 
the accused mav be required to: 
• • • • 
(6) Permit the taking of samples of bloon, 
hair, fingernail scrapings, and other 
bodily materials which can be obtained 
without unreasonable intrusion~ 
• • • • 
Pursuant to~ 77-35-16(h), Deputy Salt Lake County 
Attorney Ernie Jones filed a "Motion and Order for Production 
of Hair and Body Fluin Samples" and an accompanying "Notice of 
Rearing" (~. 7-9). on October 14, 19A2, Fifth Circuit Court 
*All statutory references herein are to Utah Code 
Annotated. 
-5-
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Judge Arthur ~. Christean granted the Motion and ordered 
appellant to "surrenoer hair, hody ano pubic hair samples 
together with saliva and bloon fluins ••• " (R. A). 
Appellant contenns that ,ludge r.hristean 's nrder exceeds the 
jurisdiction vested in a magistrate handling a felony case. 
-~. A MA(;! S 'T"R ATE IN tr:::' AH HAS S':'ATUTORY 
A tl':T"nnRITY ':"n O:RDP.:R THB TA T<I N~ ()~ HAIR 
AND BLOOD SAMPLRS. 
van nam v. Morris, ut ah , 5 71 P. 2d 13 25 ( 19; 7) , 
establishes the principle that: 
The authority of a magistrate is purely 
statutory. A judge, who sits as a 
magistrate does not carry his court or his 
judicial attributes with him, except to 
the extent they inhere in the office of 
JTlagistrate. 
Id. at 1327. ~he statutory authority for Judge Christean's 
Orner in the instant case is~ '7-35-16(h) (Rupp. 1981). The 
authority given therein is not, contrary to appellant's 
position, limited to the exercise by a "court": the authority 
rnay be invoked at all stages of the criminal process. R.ecause 
of the absence of any limiting language in s 77-15-lh(h) 
(e.g., the specific references to "the court" in~ 
77-35-16(f),(g)), it must be assumed that the legislative 
intent was to confer the powers of ~ 77-35-l~(h) upon both 
magistrate and trial judge alike. 
-6-
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In Rolman v. Superior Court of Monterey County, 174 
Cal. Rptr. 506, 629 P.2d 14 (1981), the California Supreme 
Court was presented with a case similar to the.one at bar. 
Defendants in a narcotics case sought discovery of names of 
witnesses, reports and physical evidence prior to the 
preliminary hearing. The prosecutor resisted the efforts at 
discovery by asserting that the magistrate lacked jurisdiction 
to issue discovery orders because only "courts" may order 
pretrial discovery. In finding that limited discovery should 
be available prior to the preliminary hearing, the unanimous 
court stated: 
As we indicated above, it is the 
general rule that in the absence of 
contrary legislation courts have the 
inherent power to order appropriate 
pretrial discovery. We believe a similar 
inherent power exists, and may be 
exercised, by magistrates ancillary to 
their statutory power to determine whether 
there is probable cause to hold the 
defendant to answer. The magistrate's 
statutory role is directed toward making a 
preliminary assessment of the truth or 
falsity of the charges filed against the 
defendant1 pretrial discovery may well 
assist in such a determination (citation 
omitted). 
629 P.2d at 17. S 77-35-16(h) (Supp. 1981) provides the 
statutory authority that was missing in Holman, thereby 
supplementing the inherent power of a magistrate with an 
express legislative prerogative. 
-7-
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Appellant cites van narn v. Morris in support of his 
argument that a magistrate lacks jurisdiction to issue orners 
compelling the surrender of hair and hlooa samples. van nam 
must be limited to its holding, i.e., that a magistrate 
conducting a preliminary henring may only discharge the 
defendant "without prejudice" or bind him over for trial in 
the district court. .1\ magistrate cannot exceed the 
jurisdiction over a case granted to him by statute. ~he issue 
in the instant case is not one of jurisdiction; the 
magistrate's order compelling hair and bloon samples in no way 
divests the district court of the ultimate jurisdiction over 
the felony case. 
Appellant makes much of the Memorandum Decision of 
Third nistrict Judge Dean ~. Conder in Cannon v. ~eller, Misc. 
No. M- 80- 8 8 ( ~h ird Dist. Ct. , necembe r 1 C), 1~80) { 'P. 2 4) • 
~ecause lJunge Conder' s decision is on appeal to this court as 
Cannon v. ~eller and nssana, No. 18441 (Utah Sup. Ct., filen 
May 6, 1982), the case is deserving of brief discussion here. 
In Cannon v. ~eller, the defendant in a narcotics case sought 
the identity of a confidential informant by filing a discovery 
motion under~ 77-35-16 (Rrief of Appellant ossana at 2). 
Fifth Circuit Junqe Larry ~. Keller granted the defendant's 
motion. TJpon petition by the prosecution, ,lunge Conder then 
issuen a writ of mandamus that is the basis of the appeal to 
this court (Id. at 2-4). 
-8-
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that: 
Judge Conder's ruling was based upon his finding 
Therefore, if the defendant has any right 
to discovery before a committing 
magistrate it must be established by the 
Constitution or statute. Our Constitution 
is silent on the matter (except for •due 
process" question) and the statute is 
ambiguous to say the least. 
(R. 2~). In fact, there is no express statutory authority in 
~ 77-35-16 (Supp. lQRl) for a magistrate to order the 
prosecution to disclose the name of a confidential informant 
prior to the preliminary hearing. s 7~-35-ln{a){5) (Supp. 
1981) provides only discretionary authority at best: 
(a) Except as otherwise provide~, the 
prosecutor shall disclose to the defense 
upon request the following material or 
information of which he has knowledge: 
• • • • 
(5) Any other item of evidence which the 
court determines on good cause shown 
should be made available to the defendant 
in order for the defendant to adequately 
prepare his defense. 
The crucial distinction between Cannon v. Keller and 
the instant case is the difference between colorable, 
discretionary authority and express power. A magistrate in 
Utah has express authority to compel the taking of hair and 
blood samples. 
-9-
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B. PRACTICAL C.ONSIDF.RATinNS :R.EQUI:RPi THE 
TAKIN(; OF HAIR ANJ) RT"'non RAMP1.RS AT 
THE FARLI~ST POS~IRLE TIMP.. 
Appellant statP.s, at page five of hi~ Rrief, that: 
The fair import of the language of nule 16 
evidence [sic] a legislative intent that 
the discovery process be under the 
direction of "the court" having 
jurisdiction to try the case, and not the 
magistrate who merely conducts the 
probable cause hearing. 
If appellant's arguMent were to he followed, it would be 
necessary for a district judge to specifically authorize everv 
post-arrest procedure. The district junge would be required 
to authorize, for exa~ple: 
1. the appearance of the accused at a 
line-up; 
2. the fingerprinting of the accused; or 
3. the taking of hair and blood samples. 
~ome of these procedures (e.g., 1 ine-up, fingerprinting) could 
precede the filing of an information in many cases. ~he 
district judge would be required, without the benefit of a 
file or a single pleading, to supervise each step in the 
progression of the case from arrest through sentencing. ~he 
implications of such a cumbersome process are obvious. 
Other practical considerations are the statutorv ann 
constitutional time constraints to which a prosecutor must 
adhere. ~he State simply must have an expeditious procedure 
-ln-
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whereby physical eviaence can be obtained and (1) processed 
quickly for presentation at the preliminary hearing, if 
necessary, or (2) submitted for expert forensic analysis 
promptly enough to ensure a timely return for introduction at 
trial. If a prosecutor were required to present a motion to a 
district judge and obtain an oraer prior to securing the 
evidence, the entire- sequential chronology could break down. 
In summary, the language of ~ 77-35-16(h) is 
adequate authority for a magistrate to order the taking of 
hair and blood samples. § ~7-35-l(b\ 'Supp. 1981) provides: 
These rules shall govern the procedure in 
all criminal cases in the courts of this 
state except juvenile court cases. These 
rules are intended and shall be construed 
to secure simplicity in procedure, 
fairness in administration, and the 
elimination of unnecessary expense and 
delay (emphasis added). 
Appellant has failed to demonstrate any legal precedent or 
inherent prejudice that woulo deny the magistrate the 
authority to issue the Order in this case. In light of the 
statutory authority and the clear expression of legislative 
intent found in~ 77-35-l(b), the Order at issue must be 
permitted to stand. 
POINT II 
THE P,XTRACTION OF BLonn FROM APPPiLLANT nrn 
NOT REQUIRB A SEARCH WARRANT. 
-11-
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~he extraction of blood from appellant was a minor 
intrusion con~ucted unoer carefully controlled conditions. 
The procedure followen notice to anoellant, an adversarial 
hearing on the question and a review by a neutral and detache~ 
magistrate. !f this court should finn that the magistrate 
lacked authority to issue the subject Order, then it should 
find that no search warrant was required unner the 
circumstances. 
Appellant has recited enough of the facts of the 
controlling case, Schrnerber v. California, 3A4 rJ.S. 75; 
(1966), to establish a basis for analysis. The concluning 
sentence of Justice ~rennan's opinion in Schmerber is the key 
language: 
~hat we today hold that the Constitution 
does not forbid the States minor 
intrusions into an individual's ho~y under 
Rtringently limited conditions in no wav 
indicates that it permits more substantial 
intrusions, or intrusions under other 
conditions. 
Id. at 112. Therefore, if the procenure in the instant case 
is to be permissible, the intrusion must be minor and 
conducted under "stringently limited conditions." 
The degree of intrusion in this case was like that 
in Schmerber--an extraction of blood by a competent medical 
technician (T. ~04-nS, 322). ~he conditions of the extraction 
were also stringently limited in that: (1) an information ann 
warrant of arrest had been filed and issued, (2) the appellant 
-12-
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• 
... 
had been arrested and was in jail, (3) the state had filed a 
motion and gave notice to appellant and his attorney, (4) an 
adversarial hearing was held, and (5) the order was issued by 
a neutral and detached magistrate (who, notably, limited the 
scope of the intrusion sought by denying the state's request 
for a sperm sample (R. 8)). Appellant was afforded greater 
protection (e.g., notice, hearing) than if a search warrant 
had been sought. As is stated in Rchmerber, 
The requirement that a warrant be obtained 
is a requirement that the inferences to 
support the search "be drawn by a neutral 
and detached magistrate instead of being 
judged by the officer engaged in the often 
competitive enterprise of ferreting out 
crime" (citations omitted). 
384 u.s. at 770. The inferences in the instant case were 
drawn by a neutral and detached Magistrate, thereby avoiding 
the consequences of a constitutionally infirm search. 
The legislature has reflected the judgment that 
the extraction of blood under circumstances does not 
constitute an "unreasonable intrusion." ~ 77-3~-16(h). See 
also: State v. Mccumber, Utah, 622 P. 2d 353 ( 1980). There 
being no specific constitutional prohibition to the procedure 
followed in the instant case, the obtaining of appellant's 
blood sample must be permitted to stand. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED 
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SRQUESTF.R THE ~URY. 
-13-
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On January ~2, 1983, counsP.l for appellant filed a 
Motion to Sequester the ,lury and Notice of Hearing (R. 42). 
On the first morning of trial, the trial judge denied 
appellant's Motion (R. 4R: ~. 3), but granted counsel leave to 
renew the Motion (T. 1). r.ounsel for appellant renewed the 
Motion the following morning ('r'. 12n), and again, in the forr"l 
of a Motion for Mistrial, at the conclusion of the state's 
case (~. 369). Both Motions were nenied by the trial court. 
Appellant alleges error in the failure to sequester the jury. 
A. SF.QTJF,S':"PA~ION OF THE JURY IS A MATTER 
OF OISCRETION FO:R TH~ ~RIAL i_lUDGB. 
Section 77-17-9'1) (Supp. 1981) states: 
The court, at any time before the 
submission of the case to the jury, may 
permit the jury to separate or order that 
it be sequestered in charge of a proper 
officer. 
The language of the statute is permissive ann leaves to the 
judgment of the trial junge the continuing power to sequester. 
The trial judge properly ref used to sequester the jury in this 
case. 
Each case must be assessed on its own facts and 
circumstances. ~ee, e.q., State v. Pierre, Utah, 572 ~.2d 
133A (1977): 72 ALR 3d 100, 131. tn the instant case, Judge 
Conder initially determined that sequestration of the jury was 
not called for ann also guarded against the need arising 
during the course of the trial: 
-14-
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(1) It was confirmed that the preliminary 
hearing was conducted without "much 
publicity" (T. 3); 
(2) Sufficient voir dire was conducted to 
show that: 
(a) none of the panel of twenty 
prospective jurors knew the defendant (T. 
11), 
(b) none of the panel had heard of the 
incident (T. 12), ana 
(c) all members of the panel would 
adhere to the judge's admonitions on media 
exposure (T. 25-26); 
(3) The judge repeatedly admonished the 
jurors concerning publicity (T. 35, 117, 
266, 323, 384); 
(4) The judge directed the prosecutor to 
refer to the site of the crime as "1010 
nownington Avenue" (T. 4)--specifically to 
avoid any reference to "Sugarhouse"; and 
(5) The trial court ordered the press to 
refrain from using the term "Sugarhouse 
Rapist" and from commenting "about Mr. 
Easthope's activities prior to the trial 
that would in any way show his involvement 
with the law (T. 91-9~). 
The language that most clearly reflects the 
meticulous care taken by Judge Conder to avoid any prejudice 
to the defendant is: 
I'm concerned about any publicity on it. 
I'll keep a close eye on it and admonish 
the jurors again to avoid any news 
broadcasts on it. I think that if we call 
them in and ask them about it we only fan 
the flames even worse (T. 121). 
-15-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
B. APPELT ... ANT HAS FAITJ~n 'T'() MBF.T HIS 
BURD~N <"'F DP,MONS'!'RATINC"; A ~fJRS't'ANTIAL 
LIT<RL IHf)QD OF OR. A~TJAL P~ElTTTT1IC~. 
tn State v. Andrews, Utah, 576 P.2d 859 (1978), this 
court stated: 
It is the general rule that one who wishes 
to challenge a judge's allowance of juror 
separation must demonstrate either actual 
prejudiceor a -substantial likelihood that 
some prejudice did result from the refusal 
to sequester (citations omitted). 
Id. at 859. Appellant can only employ speculative language to 
suggest the possibility of prejudice and he fails entirely to 
deMonstrate any adverse effect of his conjecture. Absent such 
a showing by appellant, this court should adhere to the 
general rule ann permit the decisions of the trial judge to 
stand. 
POINT I'V 
TRP. TPIAL COU'RT PROPERLY OEN!BD 
APPF,LLANT' s MOTION TO POLL TH~ ~TTJR~ flTJ~I~C"; 
TRIAL. 
Appellant asserts that the trial judge's failure to 
poll the jurors on the second morning of the trial constitutes 
reversible error (~. 1/.0-21). Appellant has failed to 
estahlish any degree of prejudice that would require the trial 
judge to investigate by polling the jurors. 
-11;-
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A. 'rHE NBWS ACCOUNTS OF APPELLANT'S TRIAL 
WERE NOT PRF\TTJOICIAL. 
The trial judge in the instant case heard the news 
reports that appellant claims were prejudicial (T. 121). He 
determined that the reports were not prejudicial and appellant 
has failed in this appeal to demonstrate otherwise. Appellant 
has failed to establish an adequate appellate record for his 
basic premise, i.e.7 that appellant's reputation as the 
"Sugarhouse Rapist" was so widely known that the jurors "may 
easily have caught" a subsequent speculative "connection 
(Brief of Appellant at 17). Moreover, appellant states, "And 
at the appellant's arrest and preliminary hearing, the media 
emphatically told the public that the 'Sugarhouse Rapist' was 
again being tried for rape" (Id. at 17). This assertion is 
inconsistent with the following colloquy on the first morning 
of trial: 
THE COURT: was there much publicity in 
connection with the preliminary hearing? 
MR. BROWN: No, there wasn't. 
THE COURT: I didn't see any. 
MR. BROWN: NO television coverage at all 
at the preliminary hearing, and I never 
sought any news coverage (T. 3). 
There is simply no evidence in the record concerning any 
electronic or print media coverage that was prejudicial to 
appellant. 
-17-
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~ppellant's own citation of united States v. l.lones, 
542 F.2d ·106 (4th ~ir. 197~), is dispositive of the issue at 
hand. In llones, the asserted prejudicial publicity during 
trial included several newspaper articles which were "accurate 
condensed statement[sJ of testimony actually aamittea into 
evidence and heard by the jury", news accounts of threats to 
the judge and prosecution and a tangentially related news 
story "obliquely" imolicating the defendant in drug 
trafficking. 54~ F.2d at 196-97. ~he Jones court, relying 
upon its earlier holding in United States v. Hankish, c;o2 F.2d 
71 (4th Cir. 1974), stated: 
' [W]e do not hold that every newspaper 
article appearing during trial requires 
such protective measures. Unless there is 
substantial reason to fear preJudice, the 
trial judge may decline to question the 
jurors.' It follows then that whenever a 
claim of in-trial prejudicial publicity 
arises, the threshold question, or, as the 
Court in nnited States v. Pomponio, supra, 
put it, the •initial determination' for 
the trial court is whether the publicity 
rises to the level of substantial 
prejudicial material. If it does not rise 
to such a level, the trial court is under 
no duty to interrogate the jury or to take 
the steps marrlated by Hankish. And 
whether it does rise to the level of 
substantial prejudice requiring that 
procedure is ordinarily a question 
'committed to the trial court's 
discretion' and 'the scope of this 
judicial discretion includes the 
responsibility of determining the extent 
am type of investigation requisite to a 
ruling on the motion' (emphasis original). 
-18-
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54~ F.2d at 194. The Fourth Circuit went on to find that the 
publicity was not prejudicial. 
Appellant fails to establish the predicate of his 
own argument: 
If the trial court fails to make at least 
an initial inquiry (where media reports 
are prejudicial), the accused is thereby 
oenied the opportunity to find out whether 
or not the jurors have been exposed to the 
reports ••• (emphasis added). 
(Rrief of Appellant at 14). The limited news reports in the 
present case were not prejudicial and did not trigger a duty 
of inquiry on the part of the trial judge. 
B. ASSUMinr,, ARGUEN!Y>, THAT THE LIMITED 
PUBLICITY WAS PREJUDICIAL, THE 3URY 
WAS EXPOS ED TO AI,L SUCH INFORMATION 
THR.OUGH THE APPELLANT'S OWN TESTIMONY 
AT TRIAL. 
All of appellant's protestations concerning 
publicity of his prior rape convictions became academic at the 
point during the trial when appellant took the stana ana 
testified about the prior rapes, convictions and incarceration 
(T. 400-402, 418-19). As is statea in Jones, supra, 
With hardly an exception, the cases in 
which substantial prejudicial publicity 
during trial was found, the publicity 
involved information about the defendant 
that would not be admissible before the 
jury or that was not in fact put before 
the jury in court (citations omitted). 
-19-
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54~ F.2d at 195. The evidence in the case at bar was put 
before the jury very clearly by appellant himself. Appellant 
cannot now claim error. 
r.nNCLTJ~I()N 
Appellant's argument with respect to a magistrate's 
authority to issue orders compelling th~ taking of hair and 
blood samples ignores the language of~ 7'-3,-lh{h)(6) and is 
an attempt to stress form over substance. The argument would 
be more compelling if appellant could demonstrate some 
prejudic€ to his rights resulting from the procedure 
authorized by statute. Re cannot. Rection 77-3~-16(h)(6) is 
specific, reasonable authority for the issuance of the nrder 
in this case. 
If this court should find that Junge Christean had 
no authority to issue the subject Order, respondent's position 
requires strict Fourth AMerrlment analysis in that the blood 
sample was obtained without a search warrant and the taking 
does not fit within any of the classicly defined exceptions to 
the warrant requirement. However, close scrutiny of Schmerher 
v. California reveals that the obtaining of the blood sample 
in the case at bar was constitutionally permissible hecause it 
followed a review by a neutral and detached magistrate, it was 
a minor intrusion and it was conducted under stringently 
limiten conditions. The safeguarns of the Fourth Amendment 
were honoren and the obtaining of the blood sample should be 
val ida tea. 
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Appellant's contentions concerning prejudicial 
publicity and possible jury bias have illusory appeal because 
of appellant's past notoriety. However, the past notoriety 
had, perhaps surprisingly, apparently faded during his ten-
year incarceration. Publicity at the arrest and preliminary 
hearing stages was minimal. When counsel for appellant raised 
the issue of possible prejudice to the trial judge, immediate, 
comprehensive preventive measures were instituted. 
Sequestration of the jury is a matter within the discretion of 
the trial judge and respondent submits that Judge Conder 
properly exercised his discretion in this case. 
The verdict and judgment in the lower court should 
be affirmed. 
1983. 
Respectfully submitted this 15th day of February, 
CURTIS J. 
Assistant 
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